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The  third  annual  head-of-state  summit  of  the
Shanghai  Cooperation  Organization  (SCO)  in
Moscow on May 20, 2003, may be considered a
minor water-shed in the life of the organization,
made up of Russia, China, and the Central Asian
republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan.
First,  the  meeting  implemented  concrete
measures to institutionalize the organization, by
mandating the creation of two permanent offices
and attendant staff—an SCO Secretariat,  and a
Regional  Anti-Terrorist  Structure  (RATS).
Second,  China  has  since  emerged  as  the  first
among equals of the players in the SCO in terms
of influence and benefits, when it was decided
that Beijing would be the site of the proposed
SCO  Secretariat,  subsequently  inaugurated  on
January  15,  2004,  and  that  its  first  Secretary-
General  would  be  the  former  Chinese  Vice-
Foreign  Minster  and  Ambassador  to  Russia,
Zhang  Deguang.  Third,  although  cooperation
among  governments  of  member  states  against
terrorism,  religious  fundamentalism,  and
separatism has remained the focus of the SCO,
the  summit  expanded  its  purview  to  the
economic  sphere  by  encouraging  trade,
investment  and  infrastructural  development
among  member  states.  Lastly,  by  creating  the
RATS in Uzbekistan’s capital  of Tashkent after
protracted  discussion,  Russia  and  China
demonstrated  that  they  have  recovered
sufficiently from the shock and numbness of the
introduction  of  United  States  soldiers  and
weaponry into Afghanistan and Central Asia to
frame their  own approach to  regional  security
within the rubric of the SCO.
The fourth SCO annual summit on June 17, 2004,
in  Tashkent,  Uzbekistan,  established  five
specialized  working  groups  in  commerce,
customs,  quality  inspection,  investment
promotion,  and  transportation  facilitation.  As
part  of  its  institutionalization  efforts,  the  SCO
later  created  a  team  of  observers  to  monitor
presidential and other elections in member states.
Economic cooperation has become a priority for
the  SCO,  particularly  in  finding  markets  and
investments for major products such as oil, gas,
cotton,  gold,  livestock,  and  wheat  from  its
member states in Central Asia.
At the 2004 SCO summit, China offered US$ 900
million in preferential buyer’s credit loans to the
other  five  members  of  the  SCO.  The  Central
Asian members of the SCO called for more active
efforts on the part of the organization in helping
the  government  of  Afghanistan  fight  against
drug  production  in,  and  trafficking  from,
Afghanistan.  The  armed  forces  and  border
guards of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
are  currently  ill-equipped  financially  or
personnel-wise to interdict heroin smugglers on
their side of the border with China, now a major
destination for the contraband.
In the fall of 2004, China and Kazakhstan agreed
to create a special free-trade zone covering 300
hectares of China’s Xinjiang and 200 hectares of
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Kazakhstan’s  Khorgos,  in  which  there  will  be
zero tariffs and a free flow of goods and services.
The two countries also launched the construction
of  a  US$  700  million,  600-mile  (962-km)  oil
pipeline  with  a  peak  annual  capacity  of  20
million tons, financed equally by China’s state-
owned  China  National  Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) and Kazakhstan’s KazMuniGas, running
from Atasu in Central Kazakhstan to Alashankou
in western China, and scheduled for completion
by December 2005.
Ahead  of  the  5  July  2005  SCO  summit  at
Kazakhstan’s  capital  Astana,  China’s  President
Hu  Jintao  separately  forged  a  “strategic
partnership”  with  Kazakhstan’s  President
Nursultan  Nazarbayev.  Hu  and  Nazarbayev
reiterated the need to realize the Khorgos Free-
Trade Area, complete the Atasu-Alashankou oil
pipeline  on  time,  and  increase  bilateral  trade.
There has already been a steady influx in recent
years of Chinese merchants throughout Central
Asia,  particularly  in  Kazakhstan,  selling goods
manufactured in Xinjiang.
Central Asia’s vast hydrocarbon resources and its
geographical  proximity  make  it  a  natural
supplier of oil and gas to fuel China’s economic
development. As China’s thirst for hydrocarbon
resources  from  Central  Asia  increases  in  the
years to come, it can be expected to become more
actively  involved  in  shaping  the  political  and
security environment of the region. As a case in
point, in August 2005, the CNPC announced that
i t  has  purchased  the  Canadian-owned
PetroKazakhstan,  a  major  oil  company  in
Kazakhstan, for US$ 4.18 billion. In October 2004,
China had agreed to buy up to US$ 100 billion of
oil  from Iran, now an observer member of the
SCO.
At the 2005 summit, Hu said that China would
set aside a special fund for training 1500 people
from other SCO states over the next five years,
chiefly in the economic, scientific and technical
areas.  According  to  SCO  Secretary-General
Zhang, the organization has initiated 120 projects
concerning  customs  cooperation,  cross-border
transportation,  laws  and  regulation  coherence,
energy,  and  railway  construction.  Within  the
framework of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China
project of the SCO, railroads and highways will
be  built  through  Andijan  (Uzbekistan),  Osh
(Kyrgyzstan) to Kashgar (China); and a road will
link up Tajikistan with the Karakorum Highway
connecting China with Pakistan, which will allow
the country, and the region, a transport corridor
to the Arabian Sea.
One pressing area  of  mutual  concern for  SCO
states  is  the  politics  of  water-sharing  and
management  in  Central  Asia,  in  resolving
ownership  disputes  of  key  waterways,
conservation of depleted water resources for rice
and cotton farming, soil erosion and salinity, and
the  rapid  shrinkage  of  the  Aral  Sea.  Another
concern  is  incipient  great  power  rivalry  in
Central Asia.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks
on the U.S., Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan provided
air-base facilities for use by the U.S. military in its
act ions  against  the  Tal iban  regime  in
Afghanistan,  which  the  U.S.  government  had
accused  of  harboring  the  master-minds  of  the
attacks. Having “temporary bases” in Kyrgyzstan
and  Uzbekistan,  and  conducting  joint  military
exercises with the armed forces of Central Asian
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member states of the SCO within the rubric of
NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” program, have
guaranteed the U.S.  military a  presence in the
reg ion  tha t  was  l a ck ing  pr io r  t o  the
disintegration  of  the  Soviet  Union.
The  security  picture  in  Central  Asia  has  since
become  more  complicated.  After  withdrawing
from Central Asia following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Russia opened its first permanent
military base in Kyrgyzstan in 2003, and a second
one in Tajikistan in October 2004. The opening of
the two bases demonstrated Russia’s resolve not
to concede influence in the Central Asian “near
abroad” to the Americans. The war games that
took  place  among  the  armed  services  of  SCO
member  states  except  Uzbekistan,  held  in
Kazakhstan  and  across  the  border  in  China’s
Xinjiang in August 2003,  effectively turned the
SCO  into  a  quasi-military  bloc.  To  reinforce
solidarity of the club, only SCO members were
allowed  to  observe  the  first  bilateral  military
exercise  between  Russia  and  China  involving
almost 10,000 troops conducted from August 18
to 25, 2005.
Suppressing dissent is a major preoccupation of
SCO governments.  It  is  no secret  that  a  major
Chinese  goal  for  the  SCO  is  to  gain  the
cooperation  of  Central  Asian  governments  to
reduce the threat of Muslim Uighur separatism in
Xinjiang. Within the past year-and-a-half, China
has  reached  bilateral  understandings  with
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to crack
down on émigré Uighur separatist organizations
in their countries and repatriate Uighur refugees
and political activists to China. However, despite
coordination by the RATS in the organization’s
fight against militant religious terrorist  groups,
an undertaking abetted by the U.S.,  efforts  by
Uzbekistan  aimed  at  eradicating  the  Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan has only succeeded in
driving it underground, and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir is
still  a  security  threat  in  the  Ferghana  Valley
shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The fear of  anti-government disturbances since
the  overthrow  of  President  Askar  Akayev  of
Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and the Andijan riots
two months later that killed possibly hundreds in
eastern  Uzbekistan  seem  to  have  pushed  the
governments  of  Uzbekistan  and  Kazakhstan
closer to China. SCO Secretary Zhang appeared
to be speaking for the entire SCO membership in
the aftermath of the Andijan protests when he
labeled the disturbance “a terror attack carried
out by armed religious extremists.” China made
its  position of  non-interference very clear,  and
signed  an  energy  agreement  with  Uzbek
President Islam Karimov worth US$ 600 million
when he visited Beijing days after suppressing
the uprising.
The 2005 summit
In July 2004, the U.S. had announced that it was
withholding  some monies  from its  annual  aid
package  to  Uzbekistan  due  to  unsatisfactory
progress  in  its  human  rights  record.  This,
together with widespread regional suspicions of
American involvement in Andijan, gave Russia,
China,  Uzbekistan  and  other  SCO  states  an
opening to reduce the U.S. military presence in
Central Asia. The joint declaration at the end of
the 2005 SCO summit called for a time-table for
the withdrawal of US-led anti-terrorist forces in
Afghanistan, and for a deadline to end the use of
temporary  facil it ies  and  their  military
contingents’ presence in SCO countries, citing the
end of large-scale operations against terrorism in
Afghanistan.  Accordingly,  the  Uzbek
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government gave U.S. forces 180 days from 29
July 2005 to evict its Karshi-Khanabad air base.
The  Kyrgyz  government  was  dissuaded  from
likewise giving the U.S. military orders to leave
its Manas air-base by a visit from U.S. Defense
Secretary  Donald  Rumsfeld  promising  an
increase in Washington’s annual contribution to
Kyrgyzstan’s budget.
Iran,  together  with  Pakistan  and  India,  was
admitted to observer membership of the SCO at
its  2005 summit,  one year  after  Mongolia  was
awarded such a  privilege  at  the  2004 summit.
Given the Islamic Republic’s  animosity toward
the  U.S.  and  its  desire  to  operate  a  nuclear
program, closer relations among Iran, Russia and
China may prove a major obstacle to American
policy and power in the Central Asian region.
Since 1992, Japan has dispensed more than US$
2.5 billion in grants,  technical transfer,  training
and loans to all  five countries in Central Asia,
including neutralist Turkmenistan. To counteract
burgeoning Chinese influence through the SCO
in  Central  Asia,  and  make  sure  that  any
discussion of the region’s future will not come at
the expense of Japan’s interest, in August 2004,
the Japanese Foreign Minister initiated a meeting
with Central Asian counterparts in Kazakhstan’s
Astana to carry out joint programs to promote
regional integration and development, in what is
known  as  the  “Central-Asia  Plus  Japan
Dialogue.” Japan’s attempt to create an exclusive
organization linking Japan and the countries of
Central  Asia  confirms  its  desire  to  have  a
presence in the region.
The contest  between Russia and China on one
side, which would prefer to retain Central Asia
as their condominium, and that of the U.S. and
Japan,  which  would  like  to  expand  their
influence in the region,  is  likely to increase in
intensity in the foreseeable future.
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